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Abstract—We examine the applicability of wireless indoor
quantum key distribution (QKD) in hybrid quantum-classical
networks. We propose practical configurations that would enable
wireless access to such networks. The proposed setups would
allow an indoor wireless user, equipped with a QKD-enabled
mobile device, to communicate securely with a remote party on
the other end of the access network. QKD signals, sent through
wireless indoor channels, are combined with classical ones and
sent over shared fiber links to the remote user. Dense wavelength-
division multiplexing would enable the simultaneous transmission
of quantum and classical signals over the same fiber. We consider
the adverse effects of the background noise induced by Raman
scattered light on the QKD receivers due to such an integration.
In addition, we consider the loss and the background noise
that arise from indoor environments. We consider a number of
discrete and continuous-variable QKD protocols and study their
performance in different scenarios.
Index Terms—Quantum key distribution, quantum net-
works, BB84, decoy states, continuous-variable QKD (CV-
QKD), measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), op-
tical wireless communications (OWC).
I. INTRODUCTION
FUTURE communications networks must offer improvedsecurity features against possible attacks enabled by
quantum computing technologies. One possible solution is to
develop quantum-classical networks that allow any two users
to, not only exchange data, but also share secret key bits using
quantum key distribution (QKD) techniques. Such a key can
then be used to enable secure transmission of data between
the two users. QKD technology is commercially available
today [1], [2] and it has been used to exchange secret keys
between pairs of users connected via fiber [3] or free space [4]
channels. QKD has also been implemented in several network
settings [5], [6], [7]. Despite this progress, more work needs
to be done to make QKD conveniently available to the end
users of communications networks. In this paper, we address
wireless access to a hybrid quantum-classical network. We
consider hybrid links, with or without a trusted/untrusted relay
point, between a wireless end user and the corresponding
central office in an access network. This is done by adopting
wireless indoor QKD links and embedding them into fiber-
based passive optical networks (PONs).
QKD enables two remote users, Alice and Bob, to generate
and exchange provably secure keys guaranteed by the laws
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of quantum physics [8], [9]. The obtained secret keys can
then be used for data encryption and decryption between
the two intended users. In conventional QKD protocols, an
eavesdropper, Eve, cannot intercept the key without disturbing
the system, and accordingly having her presence discovered.
Furthermore, because of the no-cloning theorem [10], Eve
cannot exactly copy unknown quantum states. Based on these
two principles, Bennett and Brassard in 1984 came up with
their BB84 protocol in which single photons were carrying
the key-bit information from Alice to Bob [11]. Over the
time, more practical protocols have been developed that allow
us to use weak laser pulses instead of ideal single-photon
sources [12]. Nevertheless, most QKD protocols will still rely
on the few-photon regime of operation, which makes them
vulnerable to loss and background noise. This will make the
implementation of QKD especially challenging in wireless
mobile environments in which background noise is strong and
alignment options are limited [13], [14].
However challenging, embedding QKD capability into mo-
bile/handheld devices is an attractive solution for exchanging
sensitive data in a safe and convenient manner. For instance,
customers in a bank can exchange secret keys wirelessly with
access points in the branch without waiting for a teller or
a cash machine. Initial prototypes have already been made,
which enable a handheld device to exchange secret keys with
an ATM without being affected by skimming frauds [15],
[16]. As another application, it would be desirable to enable
a user working in a public space, such as an airport or a
cafe, to exchange secret keys with its service provider via
possibly untrusted nodes. Similarly, once fiber-to-the-home
infrastructure is widely available, home users should benefit
from such wireless links that connect them, via a PON, to other
service provider nodes. In this case, the connection to the PON
can be via an internal QKD node trusted by the user. Note
that, in all cases above, we are dealing with a wireless link in
an indoor environment, which may offer certain advantages,
as compared to a general outdoor setup, in terms of ease of
implementation. It is then a proper starting point for offering
wireless QKD services as we study in this paper.
The above scenarios require hybrid links on which both data
and quantum signals can travel in both wireless and wired
modes. In this case, wireless QKD signals must somehow be
collected and sent to the nearest service provider node over
an optical fiber. In order to have a cost effective solution, the
collected wireless QKD signals should be transmitted along
with classical data signals over the same fiber links. A QKD
system run on such a hybrid quantum-classical link would
then face certain challenges. First, the background light in
the wireless environment can sneak into the fiber system and
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2increase error rates of the QKD setup. Furthermore, due to
nonlinear effects in optical fibers such as four-wave mixing and
Raman scattering [17], the data channels that travel alongside
QKD channels on the same fiber can induce additional back-
ground noise on QKD systems. In particular, the impact of the
Raman scattered light can be severe [17], because its spectrum
can overlap with the frequency band of QKD channels. By
using extensive filtering in time and frequency domains, the
impact of this noise can be mitigated [18], [3], [19] and even
maximally reduced [20], but it cannot be fully suppressed.
In this paper, by considering the effect of various sources
of noise mentioned above, four setups for embedding wireless
indoor QKD links into quantum-classical access networks are
investigated. In each case, we find the corresponding key
generation rate for relevant QKD protocols. We use the decoy-
state BB84 (DS-BB84) [12], which relies on weak laser pulses,
and measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [21]
protocols in our setups. The latter protocol can provide a
trust-free link, as required in the case of a user in a public
space, between the wireless user and the central office in
an access network. The price to pay, however, is possible
reduction in the rate. We also consider the GG02 protocol [22],
as a continuous-variable (CV) QKD scheme, and compare it
with our discrete-variable (DV) protocols in terms of resilience
to background noise and loss [23], [24]. CV QKD receivers
require standard telecommunications technology for coherent
detection, and in that sense they do not rely on single-photon
detectors as their DV counterparts do.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II, the system is described and in Sec. III the key rate
analysis is presented. The numerical results are discussed in
Sec. IV, and Sec. V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe our proposed setups for hybrid
quantum-classical access networks comprised of optical wire-
less and fiber-optic links. Such setups can wirelessly connect
a mobile user, in indoor environments, to the central office
in access networks; see Fig. 1. We assume a total of N
end users, which are connected to the central office via a
dense wavelength-division multiplexing (DWDM) PON. The
corresponding wavelengths assigned to quantum and classi-
cal data channels are, respectively, denoted by Q = {λq1 ,
λq2 , ...,λqN } and D = {λd1 , λd2 , ...,λdN }. The kth user,
k = 1, . . . , N , employs wavelength λqk (λdk ) to communicate
his/her quantum (classical) signals to the central office, as
shown in Fig. 1. The same wavelengths are also used for the
downlink. In order to heuristically reduce the Raman noise
effect, we assume that the lower wavelength grid is allocated
to the QKD channels, while the upper grid is assigned to data
channels [19]. In principle, one can optimize the wavelength
allocation such that the Raman noise on the quantum channels
is minimized [25].
For our wireless user, we consider a particular indoor
environment, in which it has been shown that wireless QKD
is feasible [13], [14]. In this setting, a window-less room, of
X×Y ×Z dimensions, is lit by an artificial light source. The
Fig. 1. Schematic view of exchanging secret keys between an indoor wireless
user with a central office at the end of an access network. The transmitter is
mobile, while the QKD receiver or the collection point is fixed on the ceiling.
possibly mobile QKD transmitter is placed on the floor and
it transmits light toward the ceiling. The transmitter module
may or may not be equipped with beam steering tools. In
the former case, we assume that a minimal manual alignment
is in place, by which the QKD source is facing the ceiling.
This can be achieved by providing some instructions for the
end user during the QKD protocol. The QKD receiver or the
signal collector is fixed at the center of the room’s ceiling;
see Fig. 1. We assume that, by using some dynamic beam
steering, maximum possible power is collected from the QKD
source. This may be achieved by using additional beacon
pulses. The collected light may go through a non-imaging
optical concentrator, such as a compound parabolic collector,
and then be filtered by a bandpass filter before being detected
or sent out toward its final destination.
In each setup, we particularly study three different cases
regarding the position of the mobile QKD device. Case 1
refers to the scenario when the QKD transmitter is placed
at the center of the room’s floor and emits light upward with
semi-angle at half power of Φ1/2. In case 2, the same QKD
transmitter as in case 1 is moved to a corner of the room in
order to assess the mobility features. These cases will represent
the best and the worst case scenarios in terms of channel loss,
when minimal beam alignment is used at the transmitter end.
In case 3, the light beam at the QKD source is narrowed and
is directed toward the QKD receiver or the coupling element.
This would correspond to the worst case scenario when beam
alignment is available at both the source and the receiver. In
all cases, we assume a static channel in our analysis, that is
we assume that the channel does not change during the key
exchange procedure. The real mobile user is then expected
to experience a quality of service bounded by the worst and
best-case scenarios above. In the following, we first describe
our proposed setups and the QKD protocols used in each case,
followed by a description of the channel model.
A. The proposed setups
We consider four setups in which an indoor wireless user,
Alice, equipped with a QKD-enabled mobile device, would
exchange secret keys with a remote party, Bob, located at
the central office. In order to keep the mobile user’s device
simple, we assume that Alice is only equipped with the QKD
3Fig. 2. Setup 1, where secret key exchange between Alice and Bob is achieved
in two steps. K1 is generated between Alice and Rx, while K2 is generated
between Tx and Bob. The resultant key is computed by taking the XOR of K1
and K2. Three cases are examined according to the position and alignment
of the QKD transmitter. The DS-BB84 and GG02 protocols will be examined
in this setup. Dynamic beam steering is used at the Rx node.
encoder. That would imply that certain QKD schemes, such as
entanglement-based QKD [26], are not suitable for our purpose
if they require measuring single photons at the mobile user’s
end. Bob, however, represents the service provider node and
could be equipped with the encoder and/or the decoder module
as needed. Based on these assumptions, here, we consider
several settings depending on the existence or non-existence
of a trusted/untrusted relay point between the wireless user
and Bob at the central office. In all setups, a data channel will
be wavelength multiplexed with the quantum one to be sent
to the central office. We assume that classical data is being
modulated at a constant rate throughout the QKD operation.
1) Setup 1 with a trusted relay point: Setup 1 is applicable
whenever a trusted node between the sender and the recipient
exists. For instance, in an office, we can physically secure a
QKD relay node inside the building with which the wireless
QKD users in the room can exchange secret keys. In Fig. 2,
such a node is located on the ceiling and it is comprised of Rx
and Tx boxes. In this setup, the secret key exchange between
Alice and Bob is accomplished in two steps: a secret key,
K1, is generated between Alice and the Rx box in Fig. 2;
also, independently but in parallel, another secure key, K2,
is exchanged between Tx and the relevant Bob in the central
office. The final secret key is then obtained by applying an
exclusive-OR (XOR) operation to K1 and K2. Note that in
this setup both links are completely run separately; therefore,
the wavelength used in the wireless link does not need to be the
same as the wavelength used in the fiber link. In fact, for the
wireless link, we use 880 nm range of wavelength, for which
efficient and inexpensive single-photon detectors are available.
For the fiber link, conventional telecom wavelengths are used.
DS-BB84 and GG02 protocols will be used for this setup.
2) Setup 2 without a relay point: In this setup, we remove
the need for having a relay point altogether. As shown in
Fig. 3, the signals transmitted by Alice are collected by a
telescope and coupled to a single-mode fiber to be sent to the
central office. QKD measurements will then be performed at
the central office. Because of this coupling requirement, the
wireless signals undergo an additional coupling loss in setup
Fig. 3. Setup 2, where secret keys are exchanged between Alice and Bob
using the DS-BB84 and GG02 protocols. The latter is only used in case 3.
The QKD signals are collected and coupled to the fiber and sent to Bob,
where the measurement is performed. Dynamic beam steering is used at the
collection node.
2. To reduce the coupling loss, in this setup, and, for fairness,
in all others, we assume that the telescope at the collection
point can focus on the QKD source. This can be achieved by
additional beacon beams and micro-electro-mechanical based
steering mirrors [16]. In order to efficiently couple this photon
to the fiber, the effective FOV at the collection point should
match the numerical aperture of a single-mode fiber. That
requires us to use FOVs roughly below 6◦, although, in
practice, much lower values may be needed. In this setup,
DS-BB84 and GG02 can be suitable protocols and will be
examined in the following sections.
3) Setups 3 and 4 with untrusted relay points: The setups in
Figs. 4 and 5 are of interest whenever the indoor environment
that the wireless user is working at is not trustworthy. For
instance, if the user is working at a public place, such as a
coffee shop or an airport, s/he may not necessarily trust the
owners of the local system. In such setups, we can use the
MDI-QKD technique [21] to directly interfere the quantum
signal sent by the users with that of the central office. This
can be accomplished by, if necessary, coupling the wireless
signal into the fiber and performing a Bell-state measurement
(BSM) on the photons sent by Alice and Bob at either the
user’s end (setup 3), or at a certain place located between the
sender and the recipient at the central office (setup 4). In setup
4, we use the splitting terminal of a PON to implement such
BSMs. Note that in setups 3 and 4 we need to interfere a
single-mode signal traveling in fiber with a photon that has
traveled through the indoor channel. In order to satisfy the
BSM indistinguishability criterion, we then need to collect
only one spatial mode from the wireless channel. The flexible
beam steering used at the collection node should then satisfy
this requirement.
Here, we use a probabilistic setup for the BSM operation,
as shown in Fig. 6. In this setup, the light coming from the
two users are coupled at a 50:50 (fiber-based) beam splitter and
then detect the outgoing signals using single-photon detectors.
This simple setup is suitable for time-bin encoding techniques
in QKD, which offer certain advantages in both fiber and free-
space QKD systems. In particular, they may suffer less from
alignment issues as compared to polarization-based encoding
in wireless environments. Note that two successive clicks,
4Fig. 4. Setup 3, where secret keys are exchanged between Alice and Bob
using the MDI-QKD protocol. The BSM is performed at the user’s end in
this setup.
Fig. 5. Setup 4, where secret keys are exchanged between Alice and the
central office using the MDI-QKD protocol. The BSM is performed at the
splitting point of the DWDM PON.
one corresponding to each time bin, is required to have
a successful BSM. That would require fast single-photon
detectors with sub-nanosecond deadtimes. This is achievable
using self-difference feedback techniques developed recently
[27]. If such detectors are not available, one can rely on one
click on each detector, which roughly corresponds to declaring
half of the success cases.
B. The employed QKD protocols
We use a number of discrete and continuous-variable QKD
protocols to investigate the performance of the proposed con-
figurations. In the case of DV protocols, we use the time-bin
encoding, in which the information is encoded onto the phase
difference between two successive pulses [28]. We assume that
the gap between the two pulses is sufficiently short that similar
phase distortions would be applied to both time bins while
traversing the channel. Possible discrepancies are modeled by
a relative-phase error term ed. In the following, we provide a
brief description of QKD protocols considered in this paper.
1) DS-BB84: In the ideal BB84 protocol [11], it is assumed
that Alice, the sender, uses a single-photon source. However,
this is not necessarily the case in practice. The actual alter-
native source is a highly attenuated laser that produces weak
coherent states. The problem with using such sources is the
possibility of experiencing the photon-number-splitting (PNS)
attack [29] as each pulse might contain more than one photon.
That is, Eve can siphon a photon and forward the rest to
Fig. 6. The Bell-state measurement (BSM) module used in setups 3 and 4.
This module works for time-bin encoded QKD signals. If fast detectors are
available, as assumed here, we can do a separate measurement on each time
bin. If not, we can still measure one out of four Bell states by relying on a
single click in total on each detector.
Bob. Later, after public announcement of the bases by Alice
and Bob, Eve can measure exactly the state of the photon
without revealing her presence. The decoy-state technique was
proposed to beat this kind of attack [30]. The idea is to use
several different light intensities, instead of one, so that any
attempts by Eve to intrude on the link is more likely to be
detected [12]. In our key-rate analysis, we use the efficient
version of DS-BB84 [31], where Z basis is chosen more
frequently than the X basis. In the time-bin encoding, the Z
basis is spanned by the single-photon states corresponding to
each time-bin, whereas the X eigenbases are the superposition
of such states. We also assume that a passive Mach-Zehnder
interferometer is used for decoding purposes.
2) MDI-QKD: The MDI-QKD protocol provides an ef-
ficient method of removing all detector side-channel at-
tacks [21]. This is done by performing the measurement by
a third party, Charlie, who is not necessarily trusted. In this
protocol, Charlie performs a BSM on Alice and Bob’s signals,
where each have a DS-BB84 time-bin encoder [32], [33]. Here,
we again assume that the efficient version of DS-BB84 is in
use. After Charlie announces the measurement outcomes of
the successful events over a public channel, Alice and Bob
follow the typical sifting and post processing procedures to
come up with a shared secret key.
3) GG02: While DV-QKD requires single-photon detec-
tors, CV-QKD protocols are compatible with standard telecom-
munication technologies for coherent optical communications,
namely, that of homodyne and heterodyne receivers [34]. CV-
QKD has also, in certain regimes, the possible advantage of
being more resilient to the background noise induced in WDM
networks than DV-QKD [35]. This is due to the intrinsic
filtration of photons that do not match the spatio-temporal and
polarization mode of the local oscillator (LO) in homodyne
receivers [23]. However, for secure communication, CV-QKD
may only be practical for short distances in comparison with
DV-QKD [36], [37]. This is because of the excess noise and
loss in the optical channels, as well as the limited efficiency
of the classical reconciliation [38].
The GG02 protocol is introduced by Grosshans and Grang-
ier [22]. It is the counterpart of the BB84 protocol in the CV
prepare and measure schemes. In contrast to BB84, which
relies on discrete variables, such as the polarization of single
photons, GG02 exploits the quadratures of coherent states for
encoding the information. In GG02, two random numbers, XA
and PA are drawn by Alice according to two independent
5zero-mean Gaussian distributions with variance VA, in the shot
noise unit. The coherent state |XA + iPA〉 is then prepared,
using amplitude and phase modulators, by Alice and sent to
Bob, who randomly measures one of the two quadratures.
After this stage both users acquire correlated random data.
The error reconciliation and the privacy amplification are then
performed in order to obtain the final secure key [22]. Reverse
reconciliation [39] is used in our study.
C. Channel Characterization
In this section, we model the two parts of our communica-
tion link, i.e., the wireless and fiber-based components and find
out how much loss or background noise they may introduce.
1) Indoor optical wireless channel: A wireless QKD sys-
tem ay suffer from two issues. The first is the existence of
background noise caused by the artificial, as well as natural,
sources of light in the room. The second important issue is the
path loss, which can also have a severe impact on the QKD
performance in indoor environments. The latter is modeled by
the channel DC gain, HDC [40], [41], which determines the
portion of the transmitted power that will be detected at the
receiver.
In this paper, we follow the same methodology and as-
sumptions, as presented in our recent work in [13], [14],
to calculate the indoor channel transmittance, HDC and the
corresponding background noise. In our assumed window-less
room, the background noise induced by the artificial lamp is
calculated. That would depend on the power spectral density
(PSD) of the employed light source. The receiver’s FOV is also
important since it limits the amount of background noise that
may sneak into the QKD receiver. Here, we account for the
reflected light from the walls and the floor that would be col-
lected at the ceiling. We use optical wireless communication
(OWC) models in [40], [41] for loss and background noise
calculations. For the sake of brevity, we do not repeat that
analysis here, but give some of the key relationships below.
The DC-gain for a line-of-sight (LOS) link, which here is
used to estimate the channel transmittance, is given by [40]:
HDC =

A(m+1)
2pid2 cos(φ)
mTs(ψ)
×g(ψ) cos(ψ) 0 ≤ ψ ≤ Ψc
0 elsewhere,
(1)
where d is the distance between the QKD sender and the
QKD node on the ceiling; ψ symbolizes the incidence angle
with respect to the receiver axis, whereas φ represents the
irradiance angle. Such parameters describe the relative position
and orientation between the transmitter and receiver modules.
For instance, the orientation in case 3 is modeled by assuming
that the transmitter and receiver axes are identical and the
beam angle is narrow. Ts(ψ) is the filter signal transmission; m
and g(ψ) are, respectively, the Lambert’s mode number used to
define the directivity of the source beam and the concentrator
gain, which are given by
m =
− ln 2
ln(cos(Φ1/2))
(2)
and
g(ψ) =
{
n2
sin2(Ψc)
0 ≤ ψ ≤ Ψc
0 ψ > Ψc.
(3)
In (1)-(3), Ψc, Φ1/2 and n are, respectively, the receiver’s FOV,
semi-angle at half power of the light source and the refractive
index of the concentrator. Note that the narrower the FOV, the
higher the concentrator gain is. This, of course, meets certain
practical constraints for very low FOVs, which we try to avoid.
D. Optical fiber link
As for the optical link, we make the following assumptions.
We consider a loss coefficient α in dB/km in the single-mode
fiber. We also assume that the loss contributed by each multi-
port DWDM multiplexer, labeled as AWG (arrayed waveguide
grating) in Figs. 2–5 is Λ in dB. We neglect the loss associated
with two-to-one multiplexers.
As we mentioned earlier, the main source of background
noise in QKD channels in a fiber link is Raman scattering.
The Raman noise generated by a strong classical signal spans
over a wide range of frequencies, hence can populate the QKD
receivers with unwanted signals [17]. The receivers can be
affected by forward and backward scattered light depending
on their locations and the direction of light propagation [20].
For a classical signal with intensity I at wavelength λd, the
power of Raman noise at a QKD receiver with bandwidth ∆λ
centered at wavelength λq is given by [17], [18]
IfR(I, L, λd, λq) = Ie
−αLLΓ(λd, λq)∆λ (4)
for forward scattering, and
IbR(I, L, λd, λq) = I
(1− e−2αL)
2α
Γ(λd, λq)∆λ (5)
for backward scattering, where L is the fiber length and
Γ(λd, λq) is the Raman cross section (per unit of fiber length
and bandwidth), which can be measured experimentally. In
our work, we have used the results reported in [17] for
λd = 1550 nm and have used the prescription in [20] to adapt
it to any other wavelengths in the C band. The transmitted
power I is also set to secure a bit error rate (BER) of no
more than 10−9 for all data channels. A photodetector would
then collect a total average number of photons, due to forward
and backward scattering, respectively, given by
µfR =
ηdI
f
RλqTd
hc
(6)
and
µbR =
ηdI
b
RλqTd
hc
, (7)
where Td, ηd and h, respectively, represent the detectors’ gate
duration, their quantum efficiency and Planck’s constant with
c being the speed of light in the vacuum.
6III. KEY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, the secret key rate analysis for our proposed
setups is presented considering non-idealities in the system.
The secret key rate is defined as the asymptotic ratio between
the number of secure bits and sifted bits. Without loss of
generality, we only calculate the rate for user 1 assuming
that there is no eavesdropper present. The DS-BB84 [12] and
GG02 protocols are used for setups 1 and 2, while the MDI-
QKD protocol [21], [32] is employed for setups 3 and 4.
A. Setups 1 and 2
1) DS-BB84 protocol: The lower bound for the key gener-
ation rate in the limit of an infinitely long key is given by [12]
R ≥ q{−Qµfh(Eµ) +Q1[1− h(e1)]}, (8)
where all new parameters are defined in Appendix A. There,
we show that the expected value for these parameters in our
loss and background induced model for the channel mainly
depends on two parameters: the overall efficiency of each link
η, and the total background noise per detector, denoted by nN .
Here, nN accounts for both dark counts and background noise
in the link. In the following, we specify how these parameters
can be calculated in each setup.
In setup 1, we have two links, a wireless link and a
wired link. Below, the parameter values for each link will be
calculated separately.
Setup 1, wireless link: For the wireless channel, we assume
that the background noise due to the artificial lighting source is
denoted by nB1 , which can be calculated using the methodol-
ogy proposed in [13]. In our calculations, we upper bound nB1
by considering the case where the QKD receiver is focused
on the center of the room. The total noise per detector, nN ,
is then given by
nN = nB1ηd1/2 + ndc, (9)
where ηd1 is the detector efficiency, for the detector in the Rx
box, and ndc is the dark count rate per pulse for each detector
in the Rx box in Fig. 2. We neglect the impact of the ambient
noise in our windowless room [13]. The total transmissivity
is also given by η = HDCηd1/2. The factor 1/2 represents
the loss in the passive time-bin decoder consisted of a Mach-
Zehnder interferometer.
Setup 1, fiber link: As for the fiber-based link, the background
noise is mainly induced by the Raman scattered light. In this
setup, where Bob’s receiver is at the central office, forward
scattered light is generated because of the classical signals
sent by the users and backward scattered light is due to the
signals sent by the central office. The total power of Raman
noise, at wavelength λq1 , for forward and backward scattering
are, respectively, given by
IfT1 =[I
f
R(I, L0 + L1, λd1 , λq1)
+
N∑
k=2
IfR(Ie
−αLk , L0, λdk , λq1)]10
−2Λ/10 (10)
and
IbT1 =[I
b
R(I, L0 + L1, λd1 , λq1)
+
N∑
k=2
IbR(I, L0, λdk , λq1)]10
−2Λ/10, (11)
where L0 is the total distance between the central office and
the AWG box at the users’ splitting point and Lk is the
distance of the kth user to the same AWG in the access
network. In the above equations, we have neglected the out-of-
band Raman noise that will be filtered by relevant multiplexers
in our setup. For instance, in calculating IfT1, we account for
the effect of the forward Raman noise by the data signal
generated by User 1 over a total distance of L0 + L1, but,
a similar effect by other users is only accounted for over a
distance L0. That is because the AWG box filters most of
the Raman noise at λq1 generated over distances Lk and their
effect can be neglected. By substituting the above equations in
(6) and (7), the total background noise per detector, at Bob’s
end in Fig. 2, is given by
nN =
ηd2λq1Td
2hc
(IfT1 + I
b
T1) + ndc, (12)
where ηd2 is the detector efficiency at Bob’s receiver. Note
that in setup 1 we consider two different values for ηd1 and
ηd2 .The reason is that the former corresponds to the avalanche
photodiode (APD) single-photon detectors at 880 nm, while
the latter could be for InGaAs APD single-photon detectors
within the 1550 nm band.
The total transmissivity η for the fiber link is given by
ηfibηd2/2, where ηfib is the optical fiber channel transmittance
including the loss associated with AWGs given by
ηfib = 10
−[α(L1+L0)+2Λ]/10. (13)
Setup 2: In setup 2, the total Raman noise power for forward
and backward scattering, denoted by IfT2 and I
b
T2 are given
by IfT1 and I
b
T1, respectively. The total background noise per
detector at Bob’s end in Fig. 3 is then given by
nN =
ηd2
2
[
λq1Td
hc
(
IfT2 + I
b
T2
)
+ nB1ηfibηcoup
]
+ ndc,
(14)
where ηcoup is the additional air-to-fiber coupling loss that
the indoor background photons, generated by the bulb, will
experience before reaching the QKD receiver. The total chan-
nel transmittance between the sender and the recipient in this
setup is given by η = HDCηcoupηfibηd2/2.
2) GG02 protocol: The secure key rate for GG02 with
reverse reconciliation under collective attacks is given by [42]
K = βIAB − χBE , (15)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency. IAB and χBE are,
respectively, the mutual information between Alice and Bob,
and the amount of information obtained by the adversary in
reverse reconciliation. More details can be found in Appendix
B.
GG02 is characterized by the channel transmissivity ηch
and the excess noise ε. For estimating the latter, we need
7to consider the contribution of the bulb, εb, as well as the
Raman scattering, εr. The total excess noise, ε, is then given
by εb+εr+εq , where εq is any other additional noise observed
in the experiment. In the Appendix B formulation, the excess
noise terms must be calculated at the input. For chaotic sources
of light, if the average noise count at the end of a channel with
transmissivity ηt is given by n, the corresponding excess noise
at the input would be given by 2n/ηt [43], [44]. Below, we
use this expression to calculate εb and εr assuming that both
the Raman noise and the bulb-induced background noise are
of chaotic-light nature.
Setup 1, wireless link: In setup 1, the background noise due
to the bulb is denoted by nB1 . This is the total background
noise at the Rx box input. Given that the LO would pick a
single spatio-temporal mode with matching polarization, the
corresponding count that sneaks into the homodyne receiver
would be nB1/2. The corresponding excess noise would then
be given by εb = nB1/HDC and ε = εb + εq . In this case,
ηch = HDC. In an experiment, εq is often calculated by
measuring the corresponding parameter, εrecq , at the receiver.
In this case, εq = εrecq /(ηchηB), where ηB is Bob’s receiver
overall efficiency.
Setup 1, fiber link: In this case, ηch = ηfib, εb = 0, and
εr = nr/ηch, where
nr =
λq1Td
hc
(IfT1 + I
b
T1). (16)
Setup 2: In setup 2, ηch = HDCηcoupηfib, εb = nB1/HDC,
and εr = nr/ηch, where
nr =
λq1Td
hc
(
IfT2 + I
b
T2
)
. (17)
In all CV-QKD setups, we assume that a phase reference
for the LO is available at the receiver.
B. Setups 3 and 4 with MDI-QKD protocol
The secret key rate for the MDI-QKD setup is given in
Appendix C. The key parameters to find for this scheme
are ηa and ηb, which, respectively, correspond to the total
transmissivity seen by Alice and Bob channels, as well as
nN , which is the total background noise per detector. Here
we find these parameters for Setups 3 and 4.
Setup 3: The total forward and backward Raman noise power
for setup 3 at wavelength λq1 are, respectively, given by
IfT3 =[I
f
R(I, L0 + L1, λd1 , λq1)
+ e−αL1
N∑
k=2
IfR(I, L0, λdk , λq1)]10
−2Λ/10,
IbT3 =[I
b
R(I, L0 + L1, λd1 , λq1)
+ e−αL1
N∑
k=2
IbR(Ie
−αLk , L0, λdk , λq1)]10
−2Λ/10.
(18)
The total noise per detector, nN , for setup 3 is then given by
nN =
ηd2
4
[
λq1Td
hc
(
IfT3 + I
b
T3
)
+ nB1ηcoup
]
+ ndc, (19)
TABLE I
NOMINAL VALUES USED FOR OUR SYSTEM PARAMETERS.
System Parameters Nominal value
Number of users, N 32
Fiber attenuation coefficient, α 0.2 dB/km
AWG insertion loss, Λ 2 dB
Room size, X ,Y ,Z (4× 4× 3) m3
Semi-angle at half power of the bulb 70◦
Reflection coefficients of the walls and floor 0.7
Detector area 1 cm2
Refractive index of the concentrator 1.5
Semi-angle at half power of QKD source, Φ1/2 20◦, 1◦
DV-QKD Parameters Nominal value
Average number of photons per signal pulse, µ = ν 0.5
Error correction inefficiency, f 1.16
Dark count per pulse, ndc 10−7
Detector gate width, Td 100 ps
Relative-phase error probability, ed 0.033
Quantum efficiency of detector, ηd1, at 880 nm 0.6
Quantum efficiency of detector, ηd2, at 1550 nm 0.3
CV-QKD Parameters Nominal value
Reconciliation efficiency, β 0.95
Receiver overall efficiency, ηB 0.6
Electronic noise (shot noise units), velec 0.015
Excess noise (shot noise units), εrecq 0.002
where we account for one particular polarization entering the
BSM module.
In setup 3, ηa = HDCηd2ηcoup/2 and ηb = ηd2ηfib/2,
assuming an average loss factor of 1/2 for polarization mis-
match. Note that the two modes interfering at the BSM must
have matching polarizations. This can be achieved passively
by using polarization filters before the 50:50 beam splitter in
the BSM, in which case, an average loss of 1/2 is expected,
or, alternatively, we need to use active polarization stabilizer,
for which the corresponding loss factor approaches one.
Setup 4: The total forward and backward Raman noise power
for setup 4 at wavelength λq1 are, respectively, given by
IfT4 =[I
f
R(I, L0, λd1 , λq1) +
N∑
k=2
IfR(I, L0, λdk , λq1)]
× 10−2Λ/10 + IfR(I, L1, λd1 , λq1),
IbT4 =[I
b
R(Ie
−αL1 , L0, λd1 , λq1)
+
N∑
k=2
IbR(Ie
−αLk , L0, λdk , λq1)
+ IbR(Ie
−αL0 , L1, λd1 , λq1)]10
−2Λ/10. (20)
The total noise per detector, nN , for setup 4 is as follows
nN =
ηd2
4
[
λq1Td
hc
(
IfT4 + I
b
T4
)
+ nB1ηcoup10
−αL1/10
]
+ ndc.
(21)
In setup 4, ηa = HDCηd2ηcoup10
−αL1/10/2 and ηb =
ηd210
−[αL0+2Λ]/10/2.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide some numerical results for secret
key rates in the four proposed setups. We use a DWDM
scheme with 100 GHz channel spacing in the C-band with
32 users. We define Q = {1530.8 nm, 1531.6 nm,...,1555.62
8nm} and D = {1560.4 nm, 1561.2 nm,...,1585.2 nm} for
quantum and classical channels, respectively. We assume that
λq1 is 1555.62 nm and the corresponding λd1 is 1585.2 nm.
The classical data is transmitted with launch power I =
10(−3.85+αL/10+2Λ/10) mW, which corresponds to receiver
sensitivity of -38.5 dB guaranteeing a BER of < 10−9 [20].
In all setups, we assume that L1 = L2 = · · · = LN all equal
to 500 m.
Other nominal parameter values used in our simulation are
summarized in Table I. These are based on values that are
technologically available today. In particular, for DV-QKD
systems, we assume silicon-based single-photon detectors are
used in the 800 nm regime (setup 1, indoor channel), whereas
GaAs detectors may need to be used in the 1550 nm regime
(all other setups). The former often have higher quantum
efficiencies than the latter. That is why in our numerical
parameters, ηd1 is twice as big as ηd2. The dark count rate in
such detectors varies from (100–1000)/s for an APD, to (1–
100)/s for superconducting detectors [45]. The average dark
count rate considered here is 1000/s, which, over a period of
100 ps, will result in ndc = 10−7. In the CV-QKD system,
ηB is Bob’s receiver overall efficiency, which includes detector
efficiencies and any insertion loss in the homodyne receiver.
The parameter β is the efficiency of our post-processing, which
nowadays exceeds 95% [46]. The parameter values chosen
for the receiver electronic noise and excess noise correspond
to the observed values in recent CV-QKD experiments [37].
Based on the values chosen for our system parameters, relevant
parameters in Sec. III, such as ηfib and ηch, can be calculated
from which parameter η for each setup is obtained. The noise
parameter nN , for each setup, can similarly be found. The
Raman noise terms, in particular, have been calculated by
extracting the Raman cross section from the experimental
measurements reported in [17]. Note that, in our numerical
calculations, we often vary the coupling loss to study system
performance.
In each setup, three cases are considered for the light beam
orientation of the QKD source. In the first case, the semi-angle
at half power of the QKD source is Φ1/2 = 20◦ while the
QKD source is placed at the center of the room’s floor. With
the same Φ1/2, the QKD source is moved to the corner of the
room in the second case. We use Φ1/2 = 1◦ in the third case
where the QKD source is located at the corner of the room,
as in the second case, but the beam is directed and focused
toward the QKD receiver or the collection element. A full
alignment is assumed in the third case, while in the other two
cases the QKD source is sending light upward to the ceiling
with a wider beam angle. As for the receiver, we assume that
its telescope is dynamically rotating to collect the maximum
power from the user in the three cases. We assume that the
effective receiver’s FOV would correspond to the numerical
aperture (NA) of a single-mode fiber. For single-mode fibers,
NA is about 0.1, which means that the corresponding FOV
that can be coupled to the fiber is around 6◦. Here, the QKD
receiver’s FOV is assumed to be 6◦ in order to maximize the
collected power.
The first thing we study here is whether the loose alignment
in cases 1 and 2 would be sufficient for the proper operation
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Fig. 7. The secret key rate per pulse versus the coupling loss, ηcoup, in dB,
in setups 2, 3 and 4 in cases 1 and 2. The QKD source is placed at the center
of the room in case 1, while it is moved to a corner of the room in case
2, with semi-angle at half power of Φ1/2 = 20◦ in both cases. Receiver’s
FOV is 6◦. The decoy-state and MDI-QKD protocols are used for secret key
rate analysis. The bulb’s PSD in cases 1 and 2 is 10−7 W/nm and 10−8
W/nm, respectively. The fiber length (L0) is 10 km. (DS: Decoy state; SPP:
Single-photon pulse.)
of a networked wireless link. The short answer turns out to be
negative for setups 2–4. We already know the result for setup
1 from the previous work in [13], in which the authors show
that, if the only source of lighting in the room is an LED bulb
with a PSD on the order of 10−5–10−6 W/nm, then there will
be regions over which even in cases 1 and 2 the wireless user
can exchange secret keys with the Rx box. This seems to no
longer necessarily hold if we remove the trusted relay node in
the room. In Fig. 7, we have plotted the secret key rate versus
the coupling loss for setups 2 to 4. While for a user in the
center of the room, it may be marginally possible to exchange
keys at PSD = 10−7 W/nm, once the user moves to the corner,
the required PSD drops to 10−8 W/nm. This is not strange as
in setups 2–4, we have more loss and additional sources of
noise as compared to setup 1. The required parameter values
may not, however, be achievable in practical settings, and that
implies that dynamic beam steering may be needed at both the
transmitter and the receiver side of a wireless QKD link.
There are several other observations that can be made from
Fig. 7. We have verified that the MDI-QKD with DS has a
rather poor performance, and in order to tolerate substantial
coupling loss, we need to use nearly ideal single-photon
sources. It can also be seen that the performance of setups
3 and 4 is more or less the same. As expected, moving the
BSM module around does not make a big difference in the key
rate. Setup 3 has slightly better performance for the parameter
values chosen here, partly because setup 4 might have slightly
more Raman noise, as will be shown later. But, overall, if
one needs to go with a trust-free relay node, its position
can be decided based on the operational convenience without
sacrificing much of the performance. In forthcoming graphs,
we then only present the results for setup 3.
The situation is much more optimistic if full alignment, with
Φ1/2 = 1◦, between the wireless QKD receiver and transmitter
is attained (case 3). In this case, the QKD source is located at a
corner of the room and transmits directly to the QKD receiver
or the collector. The full alignment for this narrow beam would
highly improve the channel transmissivity. Figure 8(a) shows
key rate versus coupling loss at a PSD of 10−5 W/nm. It can
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Fig. 8. The secret key rate for setups 1–3 in case 3, in which the full alignment
between the QKD node on the ceiling and wireless transmitter is obtained.
The QKD source is placed at a corner of the room’s floor, with semi-angle
at half power Φ1/2 = 1◦. Receiver’s FOV is 6◦. (a) The secret key rate per
pulse versus the coupling loss, ηcoup, in dB. Fiber length is L0 = 10 km
and PSD is 10−5 W/nm. (b) The total secret key rate in bps versus L0 when
the coupling loss is 10 dB, PSD is 10−5 W/nm, and the repetition rate is
1 GHz. (DS: Decoy state; SPP: Single-photon pulse.)
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Fig. 9. Noise counts per detector due to (a) forward Raman scattering, (b)
backward Raman scattering, (c) the artificial lighting source, and (d) the total
background noise nN , all in count per pulse (c/p), versus L0. The bulb’s PSD
is 10−5 W/nm and ηcoup is 10 dB.
be seen that coupling loss as high as 40 dB can be tolerated in
certain setups. That leaves a large budget for loss in different
elements of the system. As compared to Fig. 7, the rate has
also improved by around three orders of magnitude. For a fixed
coupling loss of 10 dB, Fig. 8(b) shows how the remaining loss
budget can be used to reach farther central offices. It seems
that tens of kilometers are reachable with practical decoy-state
signals in all setups. In this figure, we have also shown the
total key rate for setup 1, which can serve as a benchmark
for other setups. For a repetition rate of 1 GHz, keys can
be exchanged at a total rate ranging from kbps to Mbps at
moderate distances.
There are additional interesting, but somehow puzzling,
points in Fig. 8. For instance, in Fig. 8(a), the MDI-QKD
curve with DS implies that no secret keys can be exchanged
at low coupling losses. This is counter-intuitive. But, we have
verified that the same behavior is seen in asymmetric MDI-
QKD systems, when one user’s, let’s say Alice, signal is
accompanied by a background noise. Such a background noise
would therefore undergo the same amount of loss as the Alice
signal. In a particular regime, where the background noise
is comparable to Bob’s rate of photon arrival at the BSM
module, such background photons could masquerade Bob’s
photons and cause errors. In setup 3, the background noise
that accompanies Alice’s signal is that of the bulb noise. If we
make the coupling loss very low, such a noise would easily get
into our BSM module and can cause errors. This explains the
strange behavior of the MDI-QKD curve in Fig. 8(a). Another
detailed point is in Fig. 8(b), in which the maximum security
distance for setup 2, with 10 dB of coupling loss, is 60 km.
In that case, one may expect that the security distance for
setup 1, with no coupling loss should be 50 km (corresponding
to 10 dB of fiber loss) longer, i.e., 110 km. The difference
is, however, around 30 km. This turns out to be because of
the additional Raman noise at longer distances. In order to
understand this and the previous observation better, we need
to explore the noise characteristic of the system, as we do
next.
In Fig. 9, we have plotted the noise counts per detector due
to (a) forward Raman scattering (FRS), (b) backward Raman
scattering (BRS), (c) the lighting source bulb, and (d) the total
background noise nN for each setup. In each setup, the (a)–(c)
noise components have been obtained from the corresponding
expression for nN by breaking it into its individual terms.
There are several observations to be made. In terms of order
of magnitude, all three sources of noise in Figs. 9(a)-(c), are
larger or comparable to dark count noise per pulse, where the
latter in our setup is 10−7/pulse. This proves the relevance of
our analysis that accounts for Raman and background noises.
In Fig. 9(a), the FRS in setup 4 has a surprising rise at long
distances. This is because of the launch power control scheme
in use, which requires the data transmitters to send a larger
amount of power proportional to the channel loss. At a short
fixed L1, this additional power creates additional FRS in setup
4. The effect of FRS is, however, negligible when compared
to BRS, which is roughly two orders of magnitude higher
than FRS. BRS increases with fiber length because of the
power control scheme, and will be the major source of noise
in long distances. This increase in BRS justifies the shorter-
than-expected security distances in Fig. 8(b). Finally, it can be
seen that why MDI-QKD setups are more vulnerable to bulb
noise than the DS system of setup 2. The bulb noise would
enter the BSM module in setups 3 and 4 by mainly being
attenuated by the coupling loss, whereas in setup 2, it will be
further attenuated by the channel loss. That is partly why the
rate in setup 2 can be higher than that of setups 3 and 4. Based
on these results, one can conclude that, if the MDI property
is not a crucial design factor, setup 2 could offer a reasonable
practical solution to the scenarios where a trusted relay is not
available. In the rest of this section, we will then compare the
performance of different protocols that can be run in setup 2.
Figure 10 compares the GG02 performance in setups 1 and 2
with DS-BB84. In Fig. 10(a) we study the resilience of either
scheme against background noise at low values of coupling
loss. As has been shown for fiber-based systems [35], CV-
QKD can tolerate a higher amount of background noise in
this regime due to the intrinsic filtering properties of its local
oscillator. That benefit would however go away if the coupling
loss roughly exceeds 10 dB in our case; see Fig. 10(b). This
implies that full beam steering is definitely a must when it
comes to CV-QKD. Depending on the setting of the system,
the operator can decide whether a DV or a CV scheme is the
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Fig. 10. Comparison of the GG02 and DS-BB84 protocols for setup 2 and
case 3 (except for the curve labeled GG02 (setup 1)). (a) Secret key rate per
pulse versus total background noise. The latter is assumed to be per detector
for DV-QKD, while it is per spatio-temporal mode for CV-QKD. (b) Secret
key rate per pulse versus coupling loss, ηcoup, in dB. The coupling loss in
(a) is 5 dB for setup 2 and 0 dB for setup 1. The shared fiber length (L0) is
10 km. The used bulb’s PSD is 10−5 W/nm.
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Fig. 11. (a) Regions of secure operation for DV-QKD (DS-BB84) and CV-
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The background noise is calculated per detector for DV-QKD, while it is
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from the clock rate point of view when the CV repetition rate is fixed to 25
MHz. In (a) and (b), L0 = 10 km. In (b), coupling loss is 5 dB and PSD is
10−5 W/nm.
better option.
Figure 11 shows the relevant regimes of operation for DV
and CV-QKD schemes in a different way. In Fig. 11(a), we
have looked at the maximum coupling loss tolerated by each
of the two schemes for a given background noise. It is clear
that while for low values of coupling loss, CV-QKD can
tolerate more noise, at high values of coupling loss DV-QKD
is the only option, although it can tolerate less noise. There
is therefore a trade-off between the amount of coupling loss
versus background noise the system can tolerate. In Fig. 11(b),
we have compared the two systems from the clock rate point
of view. CV-QKD is often practically constrained by its low
repetition rate. In Fig. 11(b), we have fixed the CV repetition
rate to 25 MHz [47] and have found out at what clock rate the
DV system offers a higher total key rate than the CV one. For
numerical values used in our simulation this cross-over rate
is around 200 MHz, which is achievable for today’s DV-QKD
systems. The ultimate choice between DV and CV would then
depend on the characteristics of the system, such as loss and
noise levels, as well as the clock rate available to the QKD
system.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed and studied four configurations that enabled
wireless access to hybrid quantum-classical networks. All
these setups included an initial wireless indoor link that con-
nected a quantum user to the network. Each user, in the access
network, could also communicate classically with the central
office via another wavelength in the same band. We considered
setups in which a local relay point could be trusted, as well as
setups where such a trust was not required. We showed that
with proper beam alignment it was possible, in both DV- and
CV-QKD, to achieve positive key rates for both trusted and
untrusted relay points in certain indoor environments.
The choice of the optimum setup would depend on various
system parameters, which we studied in our analysis. For
instance, we found that our MDI-QKD setups, which offered
trust-free QKD immune to measurement attacks, were mostly
insensitive to the position of their measurement module, but
could suffer harshly from the background noise generated
in the indoor environment. If the immunity to measurement
attacks was not required, we could simply collect QKD signals
at the ceiling and couple them into optical fibers along with
other data channels. With decoy-state techniques, we showed
that we could tolerate up to 30 dB of coupling loss in such
a setting, provided that full alignment is achieved. At long
distances, the Raman noise induced by the data channels
would also take its toll on the maximum secure distance
limiting it to tens of kilometers. Both Raman noise and the
background noise due to the artificial light source in the indoor
environment could be orders of magnitude larger than the static
dark count of single-photon detectors. We also showed that in
the low coupling loss regime, CV-QKD could offer higher
rates and more resilience to background noise than DV-QKD
systems. But, overall, DV-QKD schemes could offer a more
stable and flexible operation adaptable to a wider range of
scenarios. In short, using our analytical results, we can identify
the winner in realistic setups that enable high-rate wireless
access to future quantum networks.
APPENDIX A
DS-BB84 KEY RATE ANALYSIS
In this appendix, the secret key generation rate of the DS-
BB84 protocol is calculated. The lower bound for the key rate,
in the limit of an infinitely long key, is given by [12]
R ≥ q{−Qµfh(Eµ) +Q1[1− h(e1)]}, (22)
where q is the basis-sift factor, which is assumed to approach
1 in the efficient BB84 protocol [31] as employed in this work.
The error correction inefficiency is denoted by f > 1 and µ is
the average number of photons per signal pulse. Moreover, in
(22), Qµ, Eµ, Q1, e1 and h(x) are, respectively, the overall
gain, the quantum bit error rate (QBER), the single-photon
gain, the error rate in single-photon states and the Shannon
binary entropy function. In the case of a lossy channel with
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a total transmissivity of η and a total background noise per
detector of nN , the above parameters are given by [48]:
Qµ =1− e−ηµ(1− nN )2,
Eµ =
e0Qµ − (e0 − ed)(1− e−ηµ)(1− nN )
Qµ
,
Q1 =Y1µe
−µ, e1 =
e0Y1 − (e0 − ed)η(1− nN )
Y1
, (23)
where e0 = 1/2 and
Y1 =1− (1− η)(1− nN )2,
h(x) =− x log 2x− (1− x) log 2(1− x), (24)
where we assume that there has been no eavesdropping activity
in the channel. This is considered to be the normal oeprating
mode of the system and the key rate calculated under above
conditions would give us a sense of what we may expect from
our QKD system in practice. The same assumptions have been
used to calculate the key rate of other protscols as we see next.
APPENDIX B
GG02 KEY RATE ANALYSIS
The secret key rate for GG02 with reverse reconciliation,
under collective attacks, is given by [42]
K = βIAB − χBE , (25)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, IAB is the mutual
information between Alice and Bob, which, for a Gaussian
channel, is given by
IAB =
1
2
log2
V + χtot
1 + χtot
, (26)
where V and χtot are, respectively, the total variance and the
total noise given by
V = VA + 1, (27)
with VA being the variance of Alice’s quadrature modulation
and
χtot = χline + χhom/ηch, (28)
in which
χline =
1− ηch
ηch
+ ε,
χhom =
1− ηB
ηB
+
velec
ηB
, (29)
are, respectively, the noise due to the channel and the noise
stemming from homodyne detection. Also, the parameters ηB ,
velec, ε and ηch, are, respectively, Bob’s overall efficiency,
electronic noise variance induced by homodyne electronic
board, excess noise, and the channel transmittance.
In (25), χBE is the Holevo information between Eve and
Bob, and it is given by
χBE = g(Λ1) + g(Λ2)− g(Λ3)− g(Λ4), (30)
where
g(x) = (
x+ 1
2
) log2(
x+ 1
2
)− (x− 1
2
) log2(
x− 1
2
), (31)
with
Λ1/2 =
√
(A±√A2 − 4B )/2 ,
Λ3/4 =
√
(C ±√C2 − 4D )/2 . (32)
In the above equations:
A =V 2(1− 2ηch) + 2ηch + η2ch(V + χline)2,
B =η2ch(V χline + 1)
2,
C =
V
√
B + ηch(V + χline) +Aχhom
ηch(V + χtot)
,
D =
√
B
V +
√
B χhom
ηch(V + χtot)
. (33)
APPENDIX C
MDI-QKD KEY RATE ANALYSIS
In this appendix, we summarize the secret key rate of the
MDI-QKD protocol. The rates for the ideal single-photon
source and the decoy-state protocols, respectively, are
RSPPMDI−QKD = Y11[1− h(e11:X)− fh(e11:Z)] (34)
and
RDSMDI−QKD = Q11(1− h(e11;X))− fQµν;Zh(Eµν;Z).
(35)
In the above, Q11 is the gain of the single-photon states given
by
Q11 = µνe
−µ−νY11, (36)
where µ (ν) is the mean number of photons in the signal state
sent by Alice (Bob) and Y11 is the yield of the single-photon
states given by
Y11 =(1− nN )2[ηaηb/2 + (2ηa + 2ηb − 3ηaηb)nN
+ 4(1− ηa)(1− ηb)n2N ], (37)
where nN represents the total noise per detector and ηa and
ηb are, respectively, the total transmittance between Alice and
Bob sides and that of Charlie [48]. In (34) and (35), e11;Z ,
e11;X , Qµν;Z and Eµν;Z , respectively, represent the QBER in
the Z basis for single-photon states, the phase error for single-
photon states, the overall gain and the QBER in the Z-basis,
which are given by [48]:
e11;XY11 =Y11/2− (1/2− ed)(1− nN )2ηaηb/2,
e11;ZY11 =Y11/2− (1/2− ed)(1− nN )2(1− 2nN )ηaηb/2,
Qµν;Z =QC +QE , Eµν;ZQµν;Z = edQc + (1− ed)QE ,
(38)
where
QC =2(1− nN )2e−µ
′
/2[1− (1− nN )e−ηaµ/2]
× [1− (1− nN )e−ηbν/2]
QE =2nN (1− nN )2e−µ
′
/2[I0(2x)− (1− nN )e−µ
′
/2],
(39)
with x =
√
ηaµηbν /2, µ
′
= ηaµ + ηbν and I0 being the
modified Bessel function.
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